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A Note on Trust
Powers after Termination

By Bernard D. Meltzer*
Mr. Harrison F. Durand, writing in
1945, observed that trust agreements
typically do not make express provision with respect to trust powers
during the winding-up period, i.e., the
period between the time fixed by an
agreement for the termination of the
trust and the time when the trust
assets are ultimately distributed.'
Lawyers in Chicago specializing in
trusts and estates, as well as a few
trust agreements that I have happened
to examine, have indicated that
Durand's observation remains largely
true today. Some form books do, however, set forth clauses that would preserve the antecedent authority of trus2
tees during the winding-up period.
Although there have been general
expressions of doubt regarding the
validity of provisions expressly conferring broad trust powers for the
period following "termination," 3 it is
difficult to see any substantive basis
for that position. 4 It is true that there
appears to be an obvious formal inconsistency in providing both that a
trust shall terminate after the occurrence of a particular event and that
* The author is pleased to acknowledge the
helpful suggestions of his colleagues, Professors Allison Dunham, and Richard Epstein;
and of Leo Herzel, Esq., and John Thomson,
Esq., both of The Chicago Bar Association.
They do not necessarily agree with all the
views set forth herein.

the trust powers shall continue thereafter. But even this wholly formal inconsistency could be avoided by a
provision expressly deferring "termination" if distribution of the trust
assets were impracticable, e.g., because of unresolved tax liabilities, litigation involving the validity of a pertinent will, or other factors that would
make distribution impossible or imprudent. But such semantic refinements appear to be unnecessary. It
should be sufficient that the settlor
has clearly indicated the trust powers
that are to operate during the winding-up period, since there is no apparent reason in this context for ignoring the general trust principle that
the settlor's purposes should be respected. On the contrary, the case for
observing that principle is strengthened by the difficulties, developed below, that result from the failure expressly to define trust powers for the
winding-up period.
In the absence of such a definition,
trustees frequently adopt rigid investment policies on the ground that they
are compelled by law. It is true that
trustees can defend such policies by
pointing to black-letter doctrine that
drastically limits their investment
authority during winding-up periods. 5
But the application of such limitations
is, in some contexts, incompatible with
Chicago Bar Record
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rational investment criteria and with
purposes fairly attributable to particular settlors. Indeed, in some situations the consequences of applying the
limiting doctrines would be so arbitrary and dysfunctional as to undermine the conclusion that such consequences are compelled by law.
The difficulties involved may be illustrated by the following situation,
adapted from an actual case. H, by a
revocable inter vivos trust, establishes
both a marital trust for his wife
("W") and a residuary trust for the
benefit of his grandchildren. The trust
agreement grants W, who is also a
co-trustee, a general power to appoint
by will the assets in the marital trust.
The principal of those trusts at their
inception (and subsequently) consists
primarily of marketable common
stocks, such as IBM and GM; and the
trustees prior to termination are
granted the broadest investment authority over both trusts and are also
given broad discretion to make distributions in cash or in kind. H dies,
and his inter vivos trust becomes irrevocable. Thereafter, W by will appoints one-half of the marital trust
property to the residuary trust, the
beneficiaries of which are minors, and
the other one-half to a dozen charities.
W's will also provides that federal
estate taxes and state inheritance
taxes, resulting from the devolution of
the appointed property and other
property owned by W both in the
United States and in foreign countries,
shall be paid from the appointed
property. W dies soon after H's death,
and the marital trust has been "terminated" by an effective appointment
made by means of a valid will. Any
substantial distribution of the prin-

cipal pursuant to the terms of the
appointment would be imprudent,
however, because of uncertainties regarding the amount of taxes to be
paid from the appointed property. At
least 36 months after W's death will
be required to determine the amount
of these tax liabilities, and both H's
trust agreement and W's appointment
are silent regarding the trustees' authority during the winding-up period.
The question is: What are the investment powers of the trustees during
the period between W's death (the
terminating event) and the time when
distribution pursuant to W's appointment would be prudent?
Lawyers have informally expressed
quite different views on this question.
One view, referred to here as "the
limitist view," is that the marital
trustees may continue to hold the
oommon stocks, but that if they sell a
common stock or if they receive funds
from dividends or other sources, they
must limit post-termination investments to short-term obligations or
other cash equivalents.
The other view is considerably less
restrictive of the trustees' authority
and goes like this: The trustees are
authorized to retain or to sell common
stock and, in making new investments,
are not restricted to short-term obligations or other cash equivalents. On
the contrary, during the winding-up
period they continue to have the
broad investment and reinvestment
authority conferred by the trust agreement. Naturally, that investment authority must be exercised in light of
the interests of the putative distributees. And, since that group includes
charities, some of which are presumably risk averse, the portfolio must be
ChicagoBar Record
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managed with a view to avoiding "excessive" risk in the portfolio as a
6
whole.
My submission is that the second
construction, which would maintain
the broad investment authority of the
trustees during the winding-up period,
is required by two interrelated considerations: (1) the purposes fairly
attributable to the donee of the power
of appointment; 7 and (2) the prerequisites for a rational investment
program during the winding-up
period. 8
In considering the purposes fairly
attributable to the donee of the
power, the following elements of the
situation are of critical importance;
First, the trust agreement designated
the same trustees for the marital and
residuary trusts, respectively, and
granted them broad investment authority with respect to the assets of
both trusts. Second, the donee of the
power of appointment, who was also
a co-trustee, appointed one-half of
the marital trust property to the
trustees of the residuary trust, who,
after distribution of the assets pursuant to the appointment, will have

broad powers of investment with respect to the distributed assets. There
is no basis for restricting those powers
during the hiatus between the terminating event and the ultimate distribution. There is the same need,
during that period, as in the periods
immediately preceding and following
it, for investment flexibility, for protection against inflation, for the authority to respond, as best one can, to
the changing fortunes of particular
companies and particular stock
markets,9 and to any changes in the
needs of the ultimate beneficiaries. It
seems indisputable that the donee of
the power, had she considered the
question of investment authority during the winding-up period, would not
have narrowed the broad authority
conferred by the trust agreement.
There is no functional justification for
any such restriction; and its duration
would be wholly accidental, depending, as it would, on the time required
to settle the amount of the liabilities
falling on the trust assets. To impose
this type of restriction during such
a fortuitously determined period is unjustifiably to defeat purposes fairly
attributable to the donee. 10

BERNARD D. MELTZER is a James Parker
Hall Professor of Law at the University of
Chicago where his basic subjects are Evidence and Labor Law. His most recent of
many accomplishments and titles include
Consultant to the U.S. Labor Department; the
Factfinding Panel Under Postal Reorganization Act; Chairman of the Hearing Committee in the Cook County Hospital Dispute.
Professor Meltzer is a member of the Coif,
the National Academy of Arbitrators, the
American, Illinois State and Chicago Bar
Associations.

May-June 1974

HeinOnline -- 55 Chi. B. Rec. 289 1973-1974

The foregoing argument obviously
depends on the congruence of trustee
authority under the terminated trust
and under the trust to which a portion
of its assets was appointed. That argument, accordingly, would not be directly applicable to the assets of the
terminated trust which were appointed
to the charities. Nevertheless, there
are strong reasons for concluding that
the latter portion should also be subject to the same broad investment authority during the winding-up period.
The instrument of appointment does
not expressly differentiate between the
two shares of the appointed property
during that period. Thus, it is fairly
arguable that the powers applicable to
the charitable portion are as great as
those plainly applicable to the other
portion. This argument might, as an
abstract matter, be challenged as a
bootstrap. Plainly, if under the governing instruments, there were sound
arguments for restricting trust authority with respect to the charitable
portion, one might, with equal logic,
begin with that portion and then
argue that investment limitations appropriate for that portion control the
other portion. Even if this sequence of
analysis were followed, it would not,
in my view, support the limitist view
in the situation under discussion. For,
as demonstrated below, that view is
arbitrary and dysfunctional, whether
it is tested by the interests of the
charities or those of the beneficiaries
of the residuary trust.
Under the limitist view, the trustees
are, it will be recalled, authorized to
retain common stocks during the
winding-up period. If, however, they
sell such stocks and wish to reinvest
the proceeds, they are limited to short-

term obligations or other cash equivalents. Such a limitation is likely to
distort decisions with respect to the
sale or retention of common stocks.
For example, let us assume that the
trustees would sell stock in the A company if they were free to invest the
proceeds of that sale in stock of the
B company, or, indeed, in convertible
bonds of the latter company. However, if reinvestment is limited to
short-term obligations, the trustees
might, at a time when the stock
market is "depressed" or short-term
yields relatively low, elect to hold the
A company stock in order to avoid
being restricted thereafter to shortterm obligations during a winding-up
period of substantial and indeterminate duration.
The limitist view distorts investment
judgment not only with respect to
particular sales, but also with respect
to the portfolio as a whole. When the
terminating event occurs, the ratio of
common stocks to bonds and cash
equivalents may be relatively high or
low. Under the limitist approach,
common stock holdings may be decreased but not increased, regardless
of considerations that typically shape
trustees' judgments regarding the appropriate ratio of common stockholdings. Such inflexibility plainly interferes with the formulation of sound
investment
policies.
Furthermore,
since the date of the terminating
event frequently is unpredictable, as
it was in the situation under consideration, this inflexible ceiling on common stock holdings becomes even
more arbitrary.
Finally, as a functional matter, the
retention of a common stock is, for
purposes of trust administration, not
Chicago Bar Record
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essentially different from the purchase
of the same stock, apart from transaction costs and tax considerations.
Thus, for example, if as the limitists
concede, the trust may retain a public
utility stock held by the trust when
the terminating event occurred, it is
difficult to see why the trust may not
purchase additional shares of that
utility. The arbitrariness of such a
proscription is underscored if we assume that the trustees wish to dispose
of a common stock holding in order
to reinvest the proceeds in a utility
stock because it is deemed to have
less risk with respect to yield or depreciation in market value, i.e., because it is considered closer to a fixed
obligation than the stock which it
replaces.
The foregoing considerations make
it plain that it is illogical and dysfunctional to interpret instruments,
such as those postulated here, as
granting trustees full authority to
retain or sell common stocks during
the winding-up period, while drastically curtailing their authority to
reinvest. To be sure, that difficulty
could be cured by interpreting the
pertinent instruments as requiring the
trustees, upon termination, to engage
in an orderly sale of all common
stocks and to reinvest the proceeds in
short-term obligations. But that cure
would be worse than the disease. It
would, in the case at hand, involve an
even greater frustration of the purposes fairly attributable to the donee
of the power of appointment. Its
rigidity would also be incompatible
with reasonable efforts to protect
against inflation during a winding-up
period of indeterminate and probably
substantial length. Finally, it would

involve transaction and possible tax
costs consequent upon the sale of
securities and the purchase of the
same or similar securities by the trustees of the residuary trust after the
principal had been distributed to
them. Accordingly, functional and
operational considerations provide
compelling support for the conclusion
that the trustees under the instruments postulated here retain during
the winding-up period their antecedent authority to acquire common
stock. '
Lawyers who reject that conclusion
do not question the force of the foregoing considerations but urge that the
limitist view is required by the "law,"
which, unhappily, is not always logical
and functional. Those lawyers suggest
that the "law," which will be spelled
out in a moment, makes the limitist
view the right policy for a trustee concerned about the possibility of being
surcharged if common stock acquired
during the winding-up period declines in value prior to distribution of
the trust assets. If, however, a trustee
reinvests the proceeds of sales of common stock or other funds in short-term
obligations, he is, the argument continues, not only conforming to the
"law," but also is avoiding the risk of
declines in money values, which are
a more prolific source of discontent
and litigation than the erosion of purchasing power by inflation. Hence, the
"prudent trustee," or at least the
trustee prudent about self-preservation, should avoid investments which,
however reasonable, might be attacked
on the ground that they exceeded his
authority.
It is undeniable that the "law," at
first blush, makes the limitists' fears
ChicagoBar Record
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plausible. Although the occurrence of
the terminating event does not automatically divest a trustee of his authority and responsibility, and although he thereafter retains the
powers and responsibilities appropriate for a complete winding-up,
there is language in the cases 2 that
indicates that a trustee's prior powers
are curtailed during the winding-up
period.
I have not attempted to collect all
the relevant cases, but I have examined the cases most frequently
cited in support of the limitist view.
Those cases involved situations quite
different from the one under discussion. First, and most important, in
those cases, there was no impediment
to immediate distribution of the trust
assets, upon the occurrence of the terminating event. 13 Second, those cases
generally involved real estate, a unique
asset, which was not subject to a
general power of sale and was to be
distributed upon termination of the
trust. 14 Plainly, those cases are a far
cry from the trust under consideration,
and their restrictive language should
not control its administration; for the
assets of this trust consist largely of
marketable common stocks, distribution of which must be postponed for
a substantial period despite the occurrence of the terminating event.
The Restatement
(Second)
of
Trusts contains general language that
also seems to support the limitist approach. Section 344, Comment f
states:
Power to invest. When the
time for the termination of the
trust has arrived, the power of
the trustee to make investments
ordinarily ceases. Where, how-

ever, the process of winding up
the trust cannot be immediately
accomplished, it may be reasonable for the trustee to make shortterm investments in order to keep
the trust property productive.
Even though the time for the
termination of the trust has not
arrived, in making investments
the trustee should take into consideration the length of time for
which the trust is to continue. See
§227, Comment o. Thus, if by the
terms of the trust the trust is to
terminate at a certain time, as for
example on a specified date or
when the beneficiary reaches a
certain age, the trustee should not
shortly before the time for termination of the trust make an investment which cannot readily be
realized until some time after the
termination of the trust.
An American Bar Association Committee relied on the first paragraph of
that Comment as a basis for the
limitist view set forth above. 15 But if
that paragraph is read together with
the second paragraph quoted above,
there is serious doubt that the Restatement incorporates an inflexible
rule limiting new investments during
the winding-up period to short-term
obligations. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the reference, in the
second paragraph of Section 344, to
Section 227, Comment o (p. 535),
which lists a broad variety of factors
to be considered in making "authorized investments." Furthermore, the
latter comment, in dealing with investments in the period immediately before the terminating event, emphasizes
the liquidity of such investments,
rather than whether they will mature
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by the time fixed for termination. It
is difficult to see why liquidity or
marketability should not also be
equally significant with respect to the
legality of investments made after the
terminating event when distribution
must be postponed for an indeterminate but probably lengthy period.
Finally, and most important, an automatic reliance on Comment f, quoted
above, would ignore the need to consider the fair implication of the provisions of a trust agreement 6 and the
settled and sound judicial tradition
that stresses concern for context, needs
and consequences in filling the gaps
or resolving the ambiguities of a
document. 1 7 In some circumstances
the approach embodied in the first
paragraph of Comment f to Section
344 would be wholly appropriate,
e.g., when cash is to be invested for
a short and determinable period prior
to distribution and when the trust
agreement does not evince the purpose of permitting common-stock investments during that period. However, in other circumstances, such as
those assumed in this note, compliance
with the general language of the first
paragraph of that comment would
produce illogical, arbitrary and dysfunctional consequences, and would
be incompatible with the purposes
fairly attributable to the settlor.' s
Neither the Restatement nor the governing canons of construction may be
fairly read as prescribing an approach
that leads to such consequences.
It seems likely, however, that in
most eases the adoption of the limitist
approach would insulate trustees
against liability; that approach, after
all, is endorsed by passages in the
Restatement and by other authorities.

Nevertheless, there are situations that
put those black-letter abstractions to
a severe test. One such situation is the
following: At the termination of a
trust, a fair estimate of the minimum
winding-up period is four years. During that time an institutional trustee
limits the investment of cash flow to
short-term obligations at interest rates
that are relatively low, i.e., below the
dividend rate for seasoned utilities.
The trustee's policy for the trust involved would have called for investmient in common stocks if the trustee
had express authority to make such
investments.
Even under the foregoing circumstances, I do not mean to suggest that
the limitist approach is the road to
liability; for the trustee may point not
only to the black-letter doctrine calling for the limitist approach but also
to the convenience of standard procedures for administration during the
winding-up period when the governing instrument fails to make any provision therefor. These considerations
are likely to bring the trustee within
the prudent-man standard. Nevertheless, in an extreme case it is not a
wholly fanciful possibility that liability might result from the limitist approach and the concomitant renunciation by trustees of their investment
discretion.' 9 Such liability would involve an obviously ironic twist since
the raison d'etre for the limitist approach is the desire to avoid liability.
Whatever difference there may be
as to the risks of, or justifications for,
relying on rules of thumb or on functional considerations during the winding-up period, there may be agreement on this point: A trust agreement
or an instrument exercising a power
Chicago Bar Record
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of appointment should deal specifically
with the powers of the trustees during
the winding-up period, and especially
so when that period may be of long
or uncertain duration.
FOOTNOTES

1. See Durand, Powers of Trustees Upon
Termination of Trusts, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
865, 866 n.2 (1945).
2. See, e.g., CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, Suggested Will and Trust Forms For

Lawyers 5, Art. VI(k) (1970), which includes within the enumeration of the trustee's powers the power "[t]o make any distribution or division of the trust property in
cash or in kind or both, and to continue to
exercise any powers and discretion for a
reasonable period after the termination of
the trust, but only for so long as no rule
of law relating to perpetuities would be
violated."
3. See Durand, supra note 1, at 865 n.2.
4. In drafting provisions for the windingup period, care must, of course, be taken to
avoid violating rules against perpetuities.
See note 2 supra.
5. See ABA COMMITTEE ON MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF TRUSTS, REPORT,
1 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST JOUR-

514, 518-19 (1966), and authorities
cited therein.
6. In the situation described in the text,
possible legal difficulties with respect to the
charities were avoided by securing their consents to the continued exercise of broad investment authority by the trustees. It should
be observed, however, that approximately
eight months were required to secure those
consents, and that during that period there
was considerable uncertainty regarding the
scope of the trustees' authority.
7. When a trust confers a power of appointment, the appointed property is generally viewed as passing as part of the donor's
estate, but an exception to this "relation
back" doctrine may operate when the donee
subjects the property to the payment of debts
or charges. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY,
Introductory Note at 1811-12 (1940); In re
Estate of Breault, 29 Ill.2d 165, 174, 193
N.E. 2d 824, 829 (1963). It is not clear
whether an exception would operate with
respect to the power under discussion here.
But in the context of this discussion the point
is a wholly formal one; for the donee of a
general power may appoint in trust or subject to charges and conditions. See 1 SCOTT,
TRUSTS §17.2 (3d ed. 1967). Hence, in determining the powers of the trustees during
the winding-up period, it seems appropriate
to consider the purposes fairly drawn from
reading both the trust agreement and the
testamentary exercise of the power granted
by that agreement. Such a reading is conNAL

templated by any reference to the "intention
of the settlor" or the "intention of the donee"
throughout this paper.
8. The arbitrariness of the limitist view is
il'ustrated by applying it to trust funds acquired as a result of an issuer's calling its
bonds or preferred stock, or liquidating its
common stock after a sale of its assets. Prior
to such action by the issuer, the trustees were,
it is conceded, authorized to retain the securities and presumably did so on the basis
of rational investment criteria. It is difficult
to see why the fortuity of such extraordinary
action by the issuer should require the trustees to invest the proceeds in short-term obligations, rather than in securities with the
characteristics deemed appropriate prior to
the call. Nevertheless, that arbitrary requirement is a corollary of the limitist view.
9. Serious questions have, of course, been
raised as to whether professional trustees or
other investment managers have special skills
in picking individual stocks or predicting
broad market movements. See J. LORIE & M.
HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES
AND EVIDENCE, ch.4, especially at pp. 96-97

and ch.5 (1973). Nevertheless, such doubts
should be sharply separated from considerations bearing on the trustees' authority and
should not be the unvoiced reason for adopting a mechanical investment policy rationalized on the basis of legal considerations.
10. See generally BOCERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, §§45, 682 (2nd ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note
at 1811-12 (1940).
11. Naturally, in exercising that authority the trustees should take account of the
distinctive needs and interests of the ultimate
distributees, including the charities.
12. See, e.g., Breen v. Breen, 411 11. 206,
212, 103 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1952); Jackson
v. Pillsbury, 380 Ill. 554, 578, 44 N.E.2d
537, 548 (1942); REPORT, supra note 5, at
518-19.
13. See McBride v. McBride, 262 Ky.
452, 464-65, 90 S.W.2d 736, 742 (1936); In
Re Rothwell's Estate, 283 Mass. 563, 570-71,
186 N.E. 662, 665 (1933); cf. Jackson v.
Pillsbury, 380 Ill. 554, 578-80, 44 N.E.2d
537, 548-49 (1942). The Jackson case, insofar as relevant here, was essentially concerned
with the question of whether the trustee was
required to distribute the proceeds. Nevertheless, without any explicit concern for context, that case has been cited as supporting
the limitist view. See REPORT, supra note 5,
at 519.
14. See McBride v. McBride, 262 Ky.
452, 455-56, 90 S.W.2d 736, 737-38 (1936);
In Re Rothwell's Estate, 283 Mass. 563,
570-71, 186 N.E. 662, 665 (1933). Similarly,
in Rothwell's Estate, the trustees, after selling assets in order to liquidate indebtedness,
pursuant to the authorization of a judicial
decree, could have distributed the trust assets. See also Matter of Miller, 257 N.Y.
349, 355-356, 178 N.E. 555, 556 (1931),
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recognizing greater trustee authority after
termination with respect to sale of personal
property, as distinguished from real property. See NOTE, Trusts: Termination of Trust:
Power of Sale: Right to Collect Rents and
Profits 39 CORNELL L. REV. 764, 766-67
(1954). It should be noted, however, that a
dictum subscribing to the limitist approach
is also found in Leith v. Mercantile Trust
Company National Association, 423 S.W.2d
75, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967), which did not
involve a trust of real estate.
15. See REPORT, supra note 5, at 519
n.51.
16. See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, §1010, 681 (2d ed. 1960); Hallin v. Hallin, 2 Ill.App.2d 118, 123, 118
N.E.2d 612, 614 (1954).
17. See generally LLEWELLYN, What
Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective,
40 YALE L.J. 704, 746 n.86 (1931). The general rules of construction of contracts also
app'y to trusts. See, e.g., Plast v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 401 Ill. 302, 313, 82 N.E.2d
155, 161 (1948).
18. See note 7 supra.
19.
It is, of course, possible for a trustee to apply for judicial construction of the
trust agreement. But when the interests of
minors, or incompetents, or persons not as-

certained are involved, one or more guardians
ad litem and trustees for unborn or unascertainable persons would normally be appointed
in such an action, usually at considerable expense. See REPORT, supra note 5, at 515.
The expense and delays of such an action may
frequently be avoided if trustees eschew
wooden applications of general statements
found in the cases and other authorities. Furthemrore, the costs of such an application will
not be payable out of the trust estate if the
application was wholly unwarranted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS §259, Comment a (1959).
On the other hand, trustees might be surcharged for failure to apply to a court for
permission to "deviate from the terms of the
trust" because of changed circumstances.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §167
(1959); cf. Leith v. Mercantile Trust Company National Association, 423 S.D.2d 75
(Mo. Ct. App. 1967) in which the beneficiary
challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, a trustee's
policy after termination to convert units in a
common trust fund into cash at the earliest
possible time, urging that the trustee had
failed to exercise any discretion. The court,
in ruling in favor of the trustee, emphasized
the beneficiary's failure to object to the trustee's contemplated action despite prior notice
thereof. Id. at 88.
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